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VIRGINIA BELL TAYLOR, Appellant, v. A.. J. HAWKINSON, Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable.-A judgment and an order
denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are
appealable, but not the jury verdict or an order denying a
new trial.
[2] Judgmenta-Res Judicata-Identities Demanded: Estoppel ID
Action on Different Causa.-Where the causes of action and
the parties are the same, a prior judgment is a complete bar
to a second action; and wbere tbe causes of action are different
but the parties are the same, the doctrine of rea judicata applies so aa to render conclusive matters which were c1ecided
in the first judgment.
[8] Id.-Res Judicata-Identity of Causes of Action: Katters Conc1uded.-A prior judgment operates as a bar against a second
action on the same cause, but in a later action on a different
claim or cause it operates aa an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually
litigated and determined in the first.
[t] Appeal-Objections-New Trial-Verdict.-m an action by
husband and wife and the driver of an automobile in which
the wife was riding for damages arising out of a collision,
where the evidence supported the trial court's implied ftnding
that the verdicts for plaintiffa following the first trial were
compromise verdicts and that the jury did not determine the
issue of liability, and where the wife's motion for Dew trial
was granted on the ground that the damages were insuftlcient,
failure of defendant or plaintJff's husband and the driver to
move for a Dew trial was tantamount to acceptiDg the iarT.
compromise as their own.
(6] Judgmenta-lLea Judicata-J/[atters
Adjudicate4.-m an
action by husband and wife and the driver of an automobile
in which the wife was riding for damages arising out of a
collision, compromise verdicts for plaintiffs did Dot constitute
nch a determination of the issues of liability as to render
them res judicata on subsequent retrial of the action where
the wife, who alone was granted a motion for Dew trial on the

.ot

[2] See Cal.Jur.2el, Judgments, § 214 et seq.; Am..Tur., Judgments,
5161 et seq.
iricK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, I§ 26,48.1,74; (2]
Judgments, II 355, 367; [3] Judgments, 11357, 395(1); [4] Appsal and Error, 1235; (5] Judgments, § 339.
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ground that the damages were insufticient, .ought to ___.,"""""
trial to the issue of damages on the ground that the JUalgm'~~1
in favor of her husband and the driver was conclusive agoLUIII'lol
defendant on the issue of liability, since defendant
have his day in court during the first trial on the issue
liability.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Angeles County, from a jury verdict, and from orders denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for
new trial. Walter R. Evans, Judge.- Judgment and
denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the veJ~dil!lt1
affirmed; appeal from jury verdict and order denying a
trial, dismissed.
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a
..
collision of vehicles. Judgment for defendant affirmed.
N. E. Youngblood and William R. Grant for Appellant.
Wyman & Finell and Saul Grayson for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Virginia Taylor, hereinafter referred to
as plaintiff, was injured when the car in which she was riding
was struck from the rear by a car driven by defendant. The
ear was registered in the name of her husband and was being
driven by a friend, Lamine Holibaugh. Plaintiff, her husband, and the driver brought an action for damages against
defendant, and the jury returned verdicts of $65 for personal
injuries suffered by the driver, $63.06 in favor of plaintiff's
husband for damages to the car. and $371.94 for personal
injuries suffered by plaintiff. Judgment· was entered on the
verdicts, and plaintiff alone moved for a new trial on the
ground that the damages were insufficient. Her motion was
granted and thereafter the judgment in favor of her husband
and the driver became final. On retrial plaintiff sought to
limit the trial to the issue of damages on the ground that
the judgment in favor of her husband and the driver was
conclusive against defendant on the issue of liability. Over
her objection the trial court submitted the issue of liability
to the jury, which returned a verdict for defendant. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and plaintiff's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative,
eA.uipecl b;y Chairman of Judicial Oouncil.
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for a new trial was denied. [1] Plaintiff appeals from the
judgment, jury verdict, and the order denying her motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
Since only the judgment and the order denying the motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are appealable
(Code Civ. Proc., § 963), the other appeals are dismissed.
Plaintiff contends that this case is governed by the rule
stated in" Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 813
[122 P.2d 892], that "In determining the validity of a plea
of res judicata three questions are pertinent: Was the issue
decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question' Was there a final judgment on the merits' Was the party against whom the plea
is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication'" Moreover, she asserts that even if a requirement of mutuality of estoppel should be deemed essential in
this case, it is met by the fact that she was in privity with
her husband in his cause of action for damages to the car.
(Zaragosa v. Oraven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 321 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.
2d 461].) Defendant contends, on the other hand, that even
though the judgment in favor of the husband and the driver
may be final for some purposes, since it was entered in
the same action in which plaintiff's motion for a new trial
was granted and since the issue of defendant's negligence was
common to all parts of the first judgment, the part as to .which
a new trial was neither sought nor granted cannot be res
judicata as to the issues set at large by the granting of
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. (See American Enterprise,
Inc. v. Van Winkle, 39 Cal.2d 210, 218 [246 P.2d 935].)
It may be eonceded that the judgment in favor of plaintiff's
husband and the driver is now final, that their causes of action
are merged therein, and that it constitutes a bar to any
further prosecution of their original claims. [2] As was
pointed out in Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195, 201-202 [99
P.2d 652,101 P.2d 497] ; the doctrine of res judicata has two
aspects. "First, where the causes of action and the parties
are the same, a prior judgment is a complete bar in the
second action. This is fundamental and is everywhere conceded.
"Second, where the causes of action are different but the
parties are the same, the doctrine applies so as to render
conclusive matters which were decided by the first judgment.
[8] As this court said in Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690,
695 (28 P.2d 916] :' A prior judgment operates as abar against
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a second action upon the same cause, but in a later actiob
upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an
estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the
second action as were actually litigated and determined in
the tirst action.'" In the present case, since plaintiff's cause
of action is different from those of her husband and the
driver, we are concerned with the second aspect stated above,
and the question presented is whether defendant's liability
was a matter decided or an issue that was actually litigated
and .determined within the meaning of the foregoing role.
[4] There is ample evidence to support the trial court's'
implied finding that the verdicts following the first trial were
compromise verdicts and that the jury did not determine
the issue of liability. The damages awarded plaintiff were
less than her special damages, and the parties concede that
they were so inadequate that a new trial limited to the issue
of damages would have been improper. (See Rose v. Melody
Lane, 39 Oa1.2d 481, 489 [247 P.2d 335].) Moreover, it is
obvious that if the jury failed to determine the issue of
liability in returning the verdict for plaintiff, it also failed
to determine that issue in returning the verdicts for her
husband and the driver. Accordingly, had defendant or
plaintiff's husband and the driver moved for a new trial,
it would have been granted, and their failure to do so was
tantamount to accepting the jury's compromise as their
own. (See Leiperl v. Honold, 39 Oa1.2d 462, 470-471 [247
P.2d 324, 29 A.L.R.2d 1185].) [6] Regardless of the effectiveness of such a compromise in extinguishing "the causes
of action or in settling the rights directly involved therein
(see Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Oal. 470, 475 (12 P. -480] ;
Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380, 389 [238 P. 81] ; FitzGerald
v. Terminal De1J. Co., 11 Oa1.App.2d 126, 135-136 {53 P.2d
177,55 P.2d 194]), it does not constitute such a determination
of the issues involved as to render them res judicata where
distinct rights are sought to be litigated in a separate cause
of action. (United States v. International Building Co., 345
U.S. 502, 506 [73 8.0t. 807, 97 L.Ed. 1182] ; Lawler v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 324, 327 [75 S.Ot.
865, 99 L.Ed. 1122]; Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc.,
311 Ky. 745 [225 S.W.2d 315, 317] ; Reel16S v. Philadelphia
Gas Works Co., 107 Pa. Super. 422 [164 A. 132, 134] ; Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324, 330; Marchant v.
Buffalo General Hospital, 166 Misc. 234 [3 N.Y.S.2d 496,
~8] ; see Hall v. Coyle,38 Oal.2d 643, 646 [241 P.2d 236];
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Bfark 1'. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 843 [129 P.2d 390]; Best.,
Judgmeuts, § 68.) To hold otherwise would tend to defeat
rather than to promote the objective of preventing vexatious
litigation with its attendant expense both to the parties and
the public. Defendant did not have his day in court during the first trial on the issue of liability, and plainti1f
can now justify making that judgment binding upon him
in her action only on the ground that he had an opportunity
to attack it. Had he done so, more rather than less litigation
would have ensued, and plainti1f would have gained nothing.
Defendant did not vex her by seeking a redetermination of
an issue once decided, but sought and secured only the right
to have the issue of liability determined once after plaintiff
by securing a new trial on all issues had established the
propriety thereof.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred..
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree that a judgment, wllich on its face determines
the question of liability in a negligence action, is not res
judicata on that issue by way of collateral estoppel in another
. action on the theory that the question of liability was not
decided because the jury in the first action assertedly compromised on the issue of liability. Whatever way you cut it,
the result reached by the majority is that an alleged compromise verdict (balancing liability against the amount of damages) is subject to collateral attack on that ground.
The facts are not involved and some legal points are clear
and these are conceded by the majority. Three plainti1fs
obtained judgments against defendant in an action in which
his liability is based, by virtue of the pleadings, the instructions to the jury, the jury's verdict and the judgment itself,
on the negligence of the defendant; that issue was necessarily
involved, indeed, it was the only issue except the fact and
amount of damages. One of the plainti1fs was granted a new
trial, but as to the others, the judgment became final, and
the trial court denied the plea of res judicata on the retrial
as to the one plainti1f. There was a privity between the
plainti1f obtaining the new trial and one of the other plaintiffs,
her husband (see Zarallosa v. Craven, SS Cal.2d 815 (202 P.2d

• c:.as--.-
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78, 6 AL.R.2d 461]), hence there can be no question that the'
judgment for the husband-plaintUf was res judicata. .No
point is made that these judgments for all three plainti1fs were'
given in the same action, and I take it the situation would be
no different if they had been obtained in separate and different
actions. The judgment for the plaintUf-husband was rea
judicata as it was based upon underlying pleadings which presented the issue of defendant's liability-his negligence; the
jury was instructed on that issue; its verdict was general,
thus deciding that iJBa.e; and the judgment was on the verdict
and therefore decided that issue. We have, therefore, a dear
case of the judgment being res judicata on the question of
defendant's liability as to one-plaintUf-wife-who was in '
privity to the plainti1r-husband (Zaragosa v. CrtWefl, IUpra).
In such a case we have a situation where under the doctrine
of res judicata, the defendant is collaterally estopped to question the final detenmnation that he was negligent. Yet the
majority arrives at • clitrerent conclusion by reasoning that
the verdict on whieIL 1he judgment was based was a compro- .
mise (supposedly 10,.- damages because some jurors thought
there should be no iiiability) which is true because the judgment as to plaintUf-wife, as to which a new trial was granted,
was a compromise ~use the damages were lower than the
amount of the specim1 damages suffered and proved. It is
then concluded that 4efendant and plaintUf-husband u ac_
cepted." the comprtmnise verdict and thUs, in effect, compromised the res judiieata judgment; hence there is no collateral estoppel becamse a judgment based on a compromise
does not give rise til such estoppel.
Accepting for the: lIIloment that reasoning and speaking to '
the legal proposition. '1tiIat a judgment based on a compromise
settlement cannot gt;:.e rise to a collateral estoppel, I find
the law to be other'W"!iBe. It is the general rule that a judgment entered by COlDP!Ilt or agreement is res judicata in the
sense that it is a bar- 'U> another action on the same cause of
action as distingu.isheri: from collateral estoppel. (Partridge v. ,
Shepard, 71 Cal. 47l1, 475 [12 P. 480] ; City of Oakland v.
Oaklcmd Water Fr~ Co., 162 Cal. 675, 686 [124 P. 251];
Semple v. Wright, ~ Cal. 659; Crossmtln v. Davis, 79 Cal.
603 [21 P. 963] ; ~ v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380 [238 P.
81]; Nielsen v. EmBf'!"sO'n, U9 Cal.App. 214 [6 P.2d 281];
Guaranty L. Corp. V"'. Board of Supervisor" 22 Cal.App.2d
684 [71 P.2d 931]; P1::t"ter,on v. Spring Valley Water Co., 207 '
I CaL 739 [279 P.loor:..:, ; Goddu,rd v. 8ecurit1l Title Iv. ct Gv4r. :
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00.,14 Cal.2d 47, 65 [92 P.2d 804] ; Lamb 1'. HermlOfl,97 Cal.
App. 193 [275 P. 603]; see also many eases cited 2 A.L.R.2d
514.) The court states in Partridge v. Shepard, supra, 71 Cal.
470, 475: "It is objected to the judgment roll in Judson v.
Molloy, that it was a 'consent judgment.'
"We know of no good reason why a judgment entered by
consent of parties in a cause of which the court has jurisdiction
of the subject-matter and of the parties is less efficacious than
if entered after a trial of the issues.
"It may be impeached like any other judicial record, by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction in the court rendering it,
by showing collusion between the parties, or by proof of
fraud on the part of the party offering the record." And the
lame is true where res judicata G8 collateral estoppel is involved. (See Partridge v. Shepard, I'Upra, 71 Cal. 470;
Semple v. Wright, supra, 32 Cal. 659; McCreery v. Fuller,
68 Cal. 80; Crossman v. Davis, supra, '19 Cal. 603; HelpUng v.
HupUng, 50 CalApp. 676 [195 P. 715] ; FitzGerald v. Pennitaal Dev. Co., 11 CalApp.2d 126 [63 P.2d 177, 65 P.2d 194].)
It is said in 2 A.L.R.2d 514, 543: "As a general proposition,
where a question of fact essential to a judgment is actually
litigated and determined thereby, the determination is conclusive between the parties and their privies in a subsequent
action, even though such action involves a different cause of
action. •••
·'Except in cases involving tax liability for successive' tax
periods, it is well settled that a judgmtmt by consent raisu
. . moppel tn the ,ame way G8 a iv.dgment mfered after
GO'ntuf, and this has been recognized even by those courts
which profess to adhere to the theory that a consent judgment
or decree is, strictly speaking, not res judicata." (Emphasis
added.) The eases cited in the majority opinion are not
to the contrary. Hall v. Coyle, 38 Cal.2d 543 [241 P.2d 236],
and Stark 1'. Ooker, 20 Cal2d 839 [129 P .2d 390], the California eases, merelynold that an issue withheld from decision
by the court is not res judicata or that an action on a compromise of a claim is not the same as an action on the
claim. It is said in United States v. International Building
CD., 845 U.S. 502, 506 [73 S.Ct. 807, 97 L.Ed. 1182]: "A
judgment entered with the consent of the parties may involve
a determination of questions of fact and law by the court.
But unless a showing is made that that was the ease, the
judgment has no greater dignity, so far as collateral estoppel
ill concerned, than any judgment entered only 18 a compro-
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mise of the parties." LawZor~. NationaZ Scree'll Be,wil1
Oorp., 349 U.S. 322 [75 S.Ot. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122], reftllSeCl]
to apply res judicata because to do so would violate an
portant public policy, the United States anti-trust laws.
Burgess v. Oonsider H. Willett, I'llC., 311 Ky. 745 [225 S.W
2d 315], rejected the proposition that a consent judgment
res judicata, which as seen is squarely contrary to the law
of this state and nearly all jurisdictions elsewhere. The
is true of Beeves v. PhiladelphiG GM W orkl 00., 107
Super. 422 [164'A.132], and Fruehauf TraiZer 00. v. ffltmO~,.e.1
167 F.2d 324, and the International Building Company
In Marchant v. BUffGZo General Hospital, 166 Misc. 234
N.Y.S.2d 496], the issue as to which estoppel by former
ment was sought was not decided by the former juCigInellt.l
The decision of the majority is, therefore, contrary to the
established law of this state.
In the foregoing discussion I have accepted the proposition
that this was a consent judgment and pointed out that eVell
as such it was res judicata, but it was not a consent judgment.
There was no agreement, settlement or compromise except
that which the majority imposes as a matter of lGw as distinguished from the voluntary understanding of the parties,
The judgment urged as estoppel had been entered. It unquestionably decided the issue of the defendant's liability.
It was relldered after a contest in a trial and on the jury's
verdict. The only consent feature that might arise is because
defendant did not attack the judgment by appeal or other.
wise. lie permitted it to become final. Nothing occurred in
the conduct of the parties nor in any communication betweell
than that indicated an actual compromise or &greelnellt to
accept the jury'. so-called compromise. The failure to appeal
was nothing more than permitting the judgment to stand by
default, the same as if no answer or contest had been made
to the complaint and a default judgment was entered. As is
said in HeZpZi'llg v. HelpZing, 50 Cal.App. 676, 682 [195 P.
715]: "The appellant'. contelltion that the former judgment
between the parties hereto did not render matters involved
therein res oajudiCGta for the reason that it was a consent
judgment is not bome out to the extent claimed by the
appellant; for while it appears that the trial judge in an
informal interview with the parties gave expression to some
doubts as to the sufiiciency of the evidellce in the case, these
doubts were not carried into the formal judgment; and it
has been repeatedly held that the ranarka of a trial judge
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made during the progress of the ease, even though they amount
to the giving of his reasons for his decision, become no part
of the judgment, and cannot be held to control or alter its
substance and effect. So far as the record herein discloses,
the only matter embraced in said judgment to which it was
suggested that the parties give their consent was that of the
amount and duration of the separate maintenance to be al.lowed the plaintUf therein. As to all other matters involved
in the ease the judgment became res adjudicata, and hence
properly relied upon by the respondent herein to defeat the
present action." And in Harter v. King County, 11 Wn.2d
583 [119 P.2d 919, 923]: "We think the very essence of a
consent decre.e is that the parties thereto have entered vol-.
untarily into a contract setting the dispute at rest, upon whicb
contract the court bas entered judgment conforming to the
terms of the agreement, without putting tbe parties to the
necessity of proof. " There is bere, therefore, no compromise,
consent or settlement judgment. If it is a default judgment
(it became final by default) then we apply the rule that a
judgment by default is the basis of a plea' of res judicata or
collateral estoppel in a subsequent action involving the same
matter, and sucb judgment is just as conclusive upon wbatever is essential to support it as is a judgment after contest.
(Burtnettv. King, 33 Cal.2d 805, 810 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.
2d 333]; Bohn v. Watson, 130 Cal.App.2d 24 [278 P.2d 454];
O'Brien v. Appling, 133 Cal.'App.2d 40 [283 P.2d 289] ; Estate
01 Williams, 36 Cal.2d 289, 292-293 [223 P.2d 248, 22 A.L.R.
2d 716] ; Horton v. Horton, 18 Cal.2d 579 [116 P.2d 605] ;
Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal.App.2d 127 [177 P.2d 364];
Morenhout v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 289; Hartson v. Shanklin, 57
Cal. 558; Harlson v. Shanklin, 58 Cal. 248; MaddU% v. County
Bank, 129 Cal. 665 [62 P. 264, 79 Am.St.Rep. 143]; Hartley v.
Griffit'kl, 133 Cal.App. 17, 23 [23 P.2d 532]; Kittridge v.
Stevens, 16 Cal. 381; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1 [147 P.
1168]; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 8 [147 P. 1171] ; Wattson v.
Dillon, 6 Cal.2d 33 [56 P.2d 220] ; San Gabriel Valley Bank v.
Lake View Town Co., 7 Cal. Unrep. 266 [86 P. 727] ; Fry v.
Baltimore HoM Co., 80 Cal.App. 415 [252 P. 752]; 128
A.L.R. 472; 29 Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 235.)
We are left, then, with no agreement, compromise or settlement, with nothing more than a judgment whose roll on its
face unquestionably decides the question of defendant's liability. Even assuming that that judgment was tbe result of a
compromise by the jurors, it must create an estoppel-be res

11

902

TAYLOl< _. HAWEOOION

(47

o~
':f=!.!t

judicata-unless it may be ignored by reason of some legal~
ground on which it may be attacked. When such an attack I
. is made in response to a plea of res judicata as to such a'
judgment, it is collateral (Gagnon 00., Inc. v. Nevada Desert
Inn, 45 Ca1.2d 448 [289 P.2d 466]) and the majority opinion
cites no authority for collaterally attacking a judgment on the
ground that the jury reached its verdict underlying the
judgment by compromise. Indeed, the majority opinion admits a collateral attack is not available because it says a
res judicata judgment is final and binding as between the
immediate parties thereto. It is no answer to say that the
judgment is not res judicata because being based on a compromise verdict the issue of liability was not determined.
(See supra, quotation from HeZpling v. HeZpling, 50 Cal.App.
676, 682.) If the jury did not decide that issue, it decided
nothing, and the judgment entered on its verdict would not
be binding on the parties thereto. To say it did not decide
the issue is to ignore the pleadings, verdict and judgment, and
to permit a collateral attack on the judgment which is not.
permitted.
If the majority opinion is permitted to stand, every judgment entered on a verdict in a personal injury action where
the amount of the verdict is less than the special damages
proved, will be void and subject to collateral attack even after
it becomes final. In other words, there will be no judgment
and the case will remain undetermined to the same extent as
if the jury had failed to agree on either the issue of liability
or damages. The foregoing conclusion must follow from
the reasoning of the majority, as the judgment in favor of
plainti1i-husband, which established defendant's liability for
the injuries suffered by both husband and wife, became final,
and must be res judicata unless it may be collaterally attacked.
If it may be collaterally attacked, it is void, and the ease,
even as to plainti1i-husband, has not been determined. I am
sure the majority would not consciously so hold.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and instruct the
trial court to proceed to trial on the sole issue of the amount
of damages sWfered by Virginia.

